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1. Introduction
When he taught at Harvard University in 1957, H.L.A. Hart surprised his Amer-
ican students by comparing law to baseball (Lacey 2004, p. 185). John Searle is 
also fond of using games as examples. In his book on The Construction of Social 
Reality he talks at length about American football, for instance. But Searle’s most 
favourite example is chess (1995, p. 28, 66; 2010, p. 10). In his article ‘How Law 
is like Chess’, (2006a) the legal philosopher Andrei Marmor claims that indeed 
law and chess are in important respects comparable social institutions. From this 
comparison he builds up an argument that is meant to convince us that legal sci-
ence and philosophy can and should be just as value free as science generally is, or 
at least generally aspires to be.
Marmor is not the only one who believes this. In The Concept of Law and in the 
Postscript (published posthumously in the second edition of the book in 1992) 
Hart explicitly argues that his philosophy of law is meant to be descriptive (or 
conceptual) and morally neutral (Hart 2012, p. 240; Cp. Postema 2011, p. 341, 
271; Marmor 2006b, p. 695; Lacey 2006, p. 954, 955). This is a heavily contested 
claim, but the legal positivism that Hart founded is developed further by what 
has come to be known as ‘institutionalism’, building on both Hart’s work and on 
John Searle’s speech act theory. If the arguments are convincing, this offers an 
interesting view on the practice and method of legal doctrinal research. In this 
article I propose to explore some of the pivotal arguments and examine their con-
sequences for the method of legal science.
The fact/value distinction appears to be at the core of Hart’s positivism. For the 
sake of clarity Hart considered it very important, before analysing and evalu-
ating the law, to first distinguish what the object of legal research and philoso-
phy is exactly. Indeed, according to Hart, this separation between fact and value 
(which informs the crucial distinction between law and morality) makes a critical 
evaluation possible in the first place (1958). The analysis of the concept of law 
is therefore meant to offer an exposition (rather than a strict definition1) of the 
* Dr. A.J. Kwak, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands.
1 ‘[The purpose of the book] is not to provide a definition of law, in the sense of a rule by reference 
to which the correctness of the use of the word can be tested; it is to advance legal theory by 
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law as a distinct object of inquiry. Hart thought that this was not an empirical 
(psychological or sociological) matter but a conceptual one, which has important 
implications for the method of legal research. Before we can do empirical research 
we need to first elucidate the normative concepts involved by means of a thorough 
analysis.2
In short, Hart argues that the object of study should first be determined and only 
then should judgments be made with regard to its merit (Marmor 2006b, p. 691; 
Lacey 2006, p. 956, 961). In his ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally 
Neutral’ (2006b), Marmor literally quotes Hart in the title and defends his idea 
that it is indeed methodologically possible to describe without somehow evaluat-
ing (endorsing or criticizing) the object under scrutiny against those who are crit-
ical of this claim to objectivity and neutrality. Some are critical with regard to the 
claim to such objectivity in the exact sciences: is value-free science truly possible? 
But in the social or cultural sciences we may have even more reason to be scepti-
cal. How can we ever do justice to human social and cultural phenomena if we do 
not truly and deeply understand, and engage with, the norms that structure them 
and the human needs, interests and values that guide them? Many have argued 
that a social and cultural phenomenon such as law is inevitably a matter of inter-
pretation, not of description.
In ‘The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship’ (1988) Edward Rubin goes 
to the heart of the matter when he argues that an academic discipline such as 
law studies a particular social practice and a practice is not a body of objective 
information. Method is therefore not a matter of logic (that is, not a matter of 
‘methodology’ in the sense of the ‘logic’ of scientific ‘method’) but of judgment. 
Rubin explains that
‘The defining characteristic of a practice, in contrast to methodology, is that its 
determinations of validity ultimately must be made on the basis of judgment, 
and perhaps intuition, rather than according to fixed rules. Being based on 
judgment, a practice is necessarily embedded in a culture and a language. As a 
result, the conclusions that any scholarly discipline produces are bounded by 
a cultural horizon that is finite, although not necessarily unchanging.’ (Rubin 
1988, p. 841)
providing an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system and a 
better understanding of the resemblances and differences between law, coercion, and morality, 
as types of social phenomena. The set of elements identified […] are treated as the central ele-
ments in the concept of law and of prime importance in its elucidation’ (2012, p. 17; Cp. Postema 
2011, 265).
2 ‘Hart’s reference to “descriptive sociology” was a gesture to the Austinian precept that an 
understanding of linguistic usage illuminates the world. […] But Hart’s own final statement of 
his position goes further yet. In one of his notebooks of the late 1980s, while accepting that he 
had been mistaken in making such a broad claim, he argued that a better formulation would 
have been that the book provided the ‘normative concepts required for a descriptive sociology’ 
(Lacey 2006, 949).
Law_and_Method_whats_in_a_game.indd   2 11-Oct-17   12:02:16
Dit artikel uit Law and Method is gepubliceerd door Boom juridisch en is bestemd voor Universiteit Leiden
What’s in a Game?
Law and Method 3
H.L.A. Hart would not agree. Indeed, law as an institutionalized discipline is a 
practice, but – and possibly this distinguishes law and legal science from many 
other practices – the determination of the validity of a legal claim is not a matter 
of judgment but indeed generally made on the basis of rules. The constitution 
prescribes the rules and procedures for valid lawmaking, and such laws prescribe 
the rules and procedures for lower-level legal rules and standards to be valid law. 
The whole structure is derived from a general rule that is applied in legal practices 
with regard to what counts as a valid legal source. To be a bit more precise, Hart 
famously argued that both the officials of the law and legal subjects generally dis-
tinguish legal rules from other rules by means of a rule of recognition. This rule 
guides us to the valid sources of law and the valid legal rules and standards these 
contain. Of course, there is a need for judgment in hard cases, but often law is a 
matter of applying rules.
Of course, you need to know what a social practice such as law is for, what purpose 
it has for the participants, if you truly want to understand the practice. Ronald 
Dworkin argues, for instance, that you do not know the law if you do not see 
the point of it all – the moral and political purposes that are part and parcel of 
this particular practice (Dworkin 1986, 2011). Such political and moral purposes 
determine, according to Dworkin, the judgment of what counts as law and what 
not. This implies that you do not only need to know the point, you have to make 
its purpose integral to your interpretation and therefore endorse or internalize 
the political morality underlying the law to truly understand your subject and to 
come up with a convincing interpretation. Dworkin argues that there is no alter-
native to this internal point of view and the engagement it requires.
Andrei Marmor takes sides with Hart on this issue and argues that with regard to 
the matter of validity there is no such dependence on moral or political standards: 
‘Non-positivists assert, while positivists deny, that moral considerations form an 
essential part of the conditions of legal validity, and conceptually so’ (Marmor 
2006b, p. 687-688). This issue is important because science in general prescribes 
the obeisance of the distinction between facts and values, partly because our val-
uations tend to get in the way when we try to get the facts right. Science should 
be as value free as possible, Max Weber famously argued, science demands unprej-
udiced observation and analysis, because our prejudices with regard to the value 
of the phenomena under investigation tend to make us blind to the facts. Nicola 
Lacey argues that H.L.A. Hart was indeed influenced by Weber’s work (Lacey 
2004, p. 229-231).
I hope to clarify this discussion by changing the subject to a game. What can we 
learn from the chess analogy? Cannot we describe a game of chess without at the 
same time endorsing, valuing or criticizing this particular phenomenon? We need 
to know the rules of the game, to be sure, and we need to know what general and 
particular purposes and human values are involved; but this does not seem to 
make it impossible to stay neutral with regard to both the purposes of games in 
general and of the game of chess in particular. But does this also hold for the study 
of the law? Is it possible to stay at a critical distance from our subject of inquiry 
here, and still be able to describe, analyse and understand the law in a relatively 
detached way? The chess analogy suggests that indeed  objective  knowledge of the 
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law is possible and that the method cannot be other than description and analy-
sis, before we evaluate our findings by means of whatever evaluative perspective 
you choose.
To put these claims in perspective I propose to first have a brief look at the philo-
sophical method Hart was introduced to in Oxford by J.L. Austin. Subsequently, I 
will discuss the institutionalist conception of the law as a (at least partially auton-
omous) structure of regulative and constitutive rules or conventions. The chess 
analogy will lead us to the idea of legal science as, in Hart’s words, ‘still descriptive 
and morally neutral’.
2. Ordinary Language Philosophy
In The Concept of Law (2012) H.L.A. Hart argued that at least two distinct char-
acteristics distinguish law from other subjects of scientific investigation. For one 
thing, law is a normative phenomenon. Legal rules are prescriptive and therefore 
not some fact that is there for us merely to observe and explain in terms of causal 
relations. Legal rules are there to observe in the sense of to obey. The law confers 
duties on both citizens and the legal officials that administer the law. If you do not 
see this normative aspect of law, you do not see the law at all.
However, not only is the law a set of norms that confer duties, it also consists of 
rules that confer particular competences or powers to particular individuals. In 
the Dutch legal order, for instance, according to the Grondwet the government and 
the parliament together have the power to proclaim the law. From one moment 
to the other, the statement ‘this is a valid law in this legal order’ has become a 
true statement merely by the legislature stating this fact. Such a declaration is 
called a ‘performative utterance’, and the law is full of such utterances. ‘I hereby 
pronounce you man and wife’, to give but one well-known example (Searle 1969; 
Cp. Culler 2000). Thus, the law entrusts many particular individuals and institu-
tions, and not only those of the state, with the power to make a particular state-
ment true by merely uttering it.
The notion of ‘performative utterance’ was devised by J.L. Austin, who became, 
together with Gilbert Ryle, the most influential philosopher of what has come to 
be known as ‘ordinary language philosophy’. H.L.A. Hart was a close colleague of 
Austin in Oxford (they taught courses together), and arguably Hart’s Concept of 
Law would not have been written if Austin had not introduced Hart to his analy-
sis of the concept of ‘rule’, a concept that became pivotal in Hart’s jurisprudence 
(Lacy 2004, p. 134). It is helpful to explore this approach to philosophy a bit fur-
ther by contrasting it with the logical positivism it tried to supplant.
Interestingly, Bertrand Russell and most members of the Vienna Circle who 
grounded logical positivism had a background in the exact sciences. But as the 
centre of gravity of British analytical philosophy gradually shifted from Russell’s 
Cambridge to Oxford, it shifted to a generation of philosophers that generally 
had a humanistic academic training (Schwartz 2012, p. 120; Lacey 2004, p. 137; 
Postema 2011, p. 264, 265). The Oxford philosophers J.L. Austin and Gilbert 
Ryle argued that the earlier generation had been too impressed with modern 
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 mathematics, logic and the natural science generally to appreciate the sophis-
tication and subtle precision of ordinary language. The logical positivists were 
unimpressed by ordinary language because it could not match the exactness of 
mathematics and logic and was therefore generally vague and often even nonsen-
sical (Cp. Ayer 1990).
But Ryle and Austin turned the tables and came to think of logical positivist 
 philosophy as crude and imprecise: in an effort to discover the ‘logic of science’, 
as Rudolf Carnap characterized philosophy (in: Rorty 1992, p. 54), logical pos-
itivists forced language into the straitjacket of a highly abstract and technical 
formal  language. They thus impoverish the language to such a degree that they 
were blinded to the subtle and rich structure of the ordinary, natural language 
we have at our disposal to talk about the world. We should instead take ordinary 
language at face value and, as J.L. Austin argued, ‘avoid at all costs oversimplifica-
tion, which one might be tempted to call the occupational disease of philosophers 
if it were not their occupation’ (1962, p. 38).3
Austin was interested in the language of the law in a way logical positivists never 
were, and this marked his relationship with the former barrister H.L.A. Hart. 
Hart recognized that the phenomenon of performative utterances was indeed 
pivotal in law. He furthermore recognized that Austin’s way of doing philosophy 
was similar, or at least related to the way lawyers analyse legal rules and concepts. 
The language of the law could be thought of as just as subtle and rich in structure 
as ordinary language generally. Hart realized that
‘… his detailed knowledge of the subtle texture of legal reasoning, pro-
vided him with a fund of examples ripe for philosophical analysis. […] He 
began to realize that legal usage provided example of conceptualization and 
distinction- making which could be put to use in philosophy.’ (Lacey 2004, 
p. 144)
Indeed, the influence went both ways. The analysis of legal concepts could be 
highly instructive for philosophers, just as philosophical analysis could take legal 
science to a higher level. Nicola Lacey argues that, on the one hand, Hart’s exper-
tise contributed significantly to the development of Austin’s ‘speech act’ theory 
(2004, p. 145) and that, on the other hand, Austin’s analysis of the meaning of 
the concept of ‘rule’ as it is ordinarily used proved pivotal for Hart’s analysis of 
the concept of law.4
3 Oxford philosopher Peter Strawson: ‘… ordinary people employing the ordinary conceptual 
resources of mankind have at their disposal not a crude, rough-and-ready instrument, but an 
enormously sophisticated instrument, for thinking; and it’s an immensely and inexhaustibly 
interesting task to trace the various connections between the concepts which people handle in 
their ordinary life with no particular difficulty’ (in: Magee 1971, p. 136, 137; Cp. Lacey 2006).
4 The notion of a rule is, of course, not only important for lawyers and moralists, but in fact 
fundamental to language in general. Speaking a language is following rules. For this reason 
Wittgenstein famously devotes a substantial part of his Philosophical Investigations (1953) to all 
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How did Austin go about his philosophical exploration of the concept of ‘rule’? 
He knew that rules are of many kinds and that therefore in order to analyse the 
meaning, and hence the use, of this word ‘rule’ thoroughly, all sorts of actual rules 
should be investigated: rules of grammar, rules of particular games or sports, 
rules of evidence, etc. His close colleague Geoffrey Warnock recounted how Aus-
tin apportioned among his group of collaborators particular kinds of rules to ana-
lyse, thus systematically dividing the big problem into limited tasks, the better to 
cover much ground (Magee 1971, p. 96).
H.L.A. Hart was not part of this particular group at the time, but he seems to have 
greatly profited from this exercise. The Concept of Law probably would not have 
been written without J.L. Austin’s work in general and his work on the notion of 
the rule in particular (Lacey 2004, p. 156). Hart realized that the influential, posi-
tivistic analyses of law by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin were seriously flawed 
because they mistook the notion of a legal rule for the notion of a command, which 
is quite a different sort of thing. As opposed to Bentham and Austin, Hart came 
to think of the notion of a rule as basic to a modern legal order: the law is indeed 
(maybe among other things; as stated previously, Hart was not looking for one 
strict definition) a system of rules, and this shift in emphasis greatly changes the 
way we look at the subject.
John Austin’s idea of law as ‘the command of the sovereign backed by threats’ 
had, apart from being clear and concise, the merit of being an attempt to make 
possible a scientific characterization of law, in the sense that the concept of law 
was clearly delimited and reducible to observable facts. This definition not only 
straitjacketed what we mean by the word ‘law’ but also presented the law from 
an explicitly external point of view. With regard to the natural world this is, of 
course, the only point of view that is available to us. But with regard to the social 
world we miss something important if we keep looking at it from the outside, 
John Searle argues, ‘because the description of the overt behaviour of people […] 
misses the underlying structure that makes the behaviour possible’ (1995, p. 5).
Indeed, as Hart writes, such an external, strictly scientific point of view loses 
sight of an important feature of a (legal) rule: its normative character.
‘If […] the observer really keeps austerely to this extreme external point of 
view […] his description of their life cannot be in terms of rules at all, and so 
not in the terms of the rule-dependent notions of obligation or duty. Instead, 
it will be in terms of observable regularities of conduct, predictions, proba-
bilities, and signs. […] What the external point of view, which limits itself 
to the observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way in 
which the rules function as rules in the lives of those who normally are the 
majority of society. […] For them the violation of a rule is not merely a basis 
for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility.’ 
(2012, p. 89, 90)
kinds of rule-following, and his analysis has proven to be of great interest for philosophers and 
linguists generally.
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Interesting from a methodological point of view is that in his introduction to 
The Concept of Law, Hart notes that this difference between the external and the 
internal points of view ‘shows itself linguistically’. He distinguishes here between 
mere convergent or conformist behaviour and truly following a rule, and argues 
that
‘In describing the latter we may, though we need not, make use of certain 
words which would be misleading if we meant only to assert the former. These 
are the words ‘must’, ‘should’, and ‘ought to’, which in spite of differences 
share certain common functions in indicating the presence of a rule requiring 
certain conduct.’ (2012, p. 9)
The law does not generally feature in the lives of the legal subjects as some exter-
nal force to be reckoned with, but as a system of rules that they experience as a 
source of obligations (2012, p. 82). In other words, although the members of a legal 
community sometimes have to be forced to comply if they choose to disrespect 
the law, they generally choose to comply voluntarily on the basis that they feel 
obliged to do so. They do so when they acknowledge that some rule is actually the 
law and when they see law as a source of norms, not merely of ‘commands backed 
by threats’.
If the law did not have this normative aspect, the resources needed to order a 
human society would be beyond measure; no orderly society could exist without 
this sense of obligation. But H.L.A. Hart and J.L. Austin seem to have learned 
this, and this is important to note here, not by means of empirical research (which 
employs a more or less external point of view), but by means of the analysis of 
ordinary language, in this case of how we use the word ‘rule’. The existence of this 
normative realm ‘shows itself linguistically’, Hart says, and by analysing its spe-
cific character and meaning we learned something about the law that we would 
not learn from the external, scientific point of view.5
3. The Separation Thesis
We should strictly distinguish legal phenomena from other normative phenomena 
such as morality or rules of etiquette, Hart argues, and he uses the same method 
here. What we refer to when we use the word ‘law’ and ‘morality’ is different in 
kind, and any competent user of the English language should be able to tell the 
difference. Moreover, not only do legal scientists actually make this distinction, 
5 We should also note that in the normative domain, generally, norms need not be practised in 
order to be valid. Indeed, we know of many perfectly valid moral and legal rules that are often 
not followed. To express this categorical difference we distinguish facts from norms. Facts 
have an empirical reality and norms have validity. Somehow, somewhere, facts and norms are 
aspects of one reality, of course; Hart argues that the rule of recognition is where factuality and 
validity meet. 
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legal officials and professionals working in legal practices and institutions, and 
many lay people, actually apply a particular rule to distinguish legal norms from 
other social norms in society. I refer to Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’,6 of course, and 
‘its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by 
courts or other officials or private persons or their advisors’ (2012, p. 98).
But note that this is actually an empirical claim. Although legal scientists and phi-
losophers of law may often not be too interested in the actual behaviour of human 
beings in society when they study law, there is one important exception to this 
rule. Hart explains,
‘[A] rule of recognition is unlike other rules of the system. The assertion that 
it exists can only be an external statement of fact. For whereas a subordinate 
rule of a system may be valid and in that sense ‘exist’ even if it is generally 
disregarded, the rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but normally 
concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identify-
ing the law by reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact.’ 
(2012, p. 110)
Hart argues (in short) that the existence of a legal order presupposes the ‘separa-
tion between law and morals’ and that in a modern society such as ours we apply 
a strictly formal rule of recognition to determine whether a norm is a legal norm 
or not (Leiter 1998, p. 534, 535). This rule of recognition is not everywhere the 
same – the Dutch use a different rule from the Americans, for instance – but Hart 
claimed that indeed the existence of such a rule is characteristic of a modern legal 
order. And to repeat, this is an empirical claim: a particular and significant part 
of society actually uses this rule of recognition to decide what the law demands. 
In particular, legal officials and professionals will do so.
In legal philosophy, this thesis has come to be called ‘legal conventionalism’ as the 
employment of a rule of recognition is thought of as a matter of convention (Hart 
2012; Marmor 1998; Postema 2011, p. 342). What does this mean for Hart’s ver-
sion of the so-called separation thesis, the thesis that law and morality are con-
ceptually distinct? Hart does not use the term, but in effect he argues that a legal 
system has a different structure. Hart depicts the law as a system of two kinds of 
rules, ‘primary rules’ and ‘secondary rules’, and he argues that particularly the 
intricate structure of these secondary, power-conferring rules coordinating the set 
of primary, duty-conferring rules (conferring specific duties on the legal subjects) 
6 Hart introduces the rule of recognition thus: ‘The simplest form of the remedy for the uncer-
tainty of the regime of primary rules is the introduction of what we shall call a “rule of recog-
nition”. This will specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is 
taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the 
social pressure it exerts’ (2012, p. 94). ‘The rule of recognition is neither itself a rule of law nor 
a transcendental presupposition; rather it is a social rule accepted and practiced by judges and 
other legal officials’ (Postema 2011, p. 285, 286).
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distinguishes law from other normative phenomena such as morality. In Hart’s 
own words:
‘Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or pri-
mary type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, 
whether they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic 
upon or secondary to the first; for they provide that human beings may by 
doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extin-
guish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or con-
trol their operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second 
type confer powers, public or private. Rules of the first type concern actions 
involving physical movement or changes; rules of the second type provide for 
operations which lead not merely to physical movement or change, but the 
creation or variation of duties or obligations.’ (2012, p. 81)
Every legal rule is, qua legal rule, valid on the basis of some power-conferring 
secondary legal rule, which is itself valid on the basis of some higher power-con-
ferring legal rule. The rule of recognition functions as the ultimate ‘foundation’ 
or ‘source’ of the hierarchical structure of rules that is thus created. Indeed, the 
fact that the whole structure of rules is founded in this rule of recognition makes 
the law into a systematic whole, makes it a system of rules ‘… for the rules are now 
not just a discrete unconnected set but are, in a simple way, unified’7 (Hart 2012, 
p. 95).
Moral systems may consist in primary rules and thereby confer duties on indi-
viduals within a particular society, and they may also be relatively unified in the 
sense of being systematically and hierarchically ordered, but there is no explicit 
and consistent set of secondary rules making clear, for instance, what exactly 
should be done in the case of violation of the rule, who exactly is competent to 
decide whether a violation has taken place, and how exactly we should react to 
such a violation. Indeed, according to Hart, supplementing the primary rules with 
secondary rules regulating such matters can be thought of – conceptually, not 
historically – as the decisive step from the pre-legal (moral) world into a modern 
legal world like ours (2012, p. 94; Cp. Marmor 2002, p. 106).
Note that a power-conferring rule authorizes a particular person or institution to 
particular performative utterances. We already referred to the state official who 
is empowered to declare two persons man and wife, a competence that is usually 
explicitly conferred on officials in a particular legal statute. Thus, the official is 
empowered by a legal statute; but what makes this statute valid? The validity of 
this statute depends on the power of the formal lawgiver to make valid  statutory 
7 ‘One distinguishing mark of constitutive conventions […] is that [they] typically come in sys-
tems. There must be a system of conventional rules to establish a social practice, that is, some 
cluster of rules intertwined in a more or less complex structure. This is a feature that stems 
from the constitutive function of such conventions, from the fact that they constitute a prac-
tice’ (Marmor 1998, p. 522; Cp. Searle 1995, p. 28).
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laws, and to change the law, a power that is conferred on this institution by the 
constitution. Treaties are, likewise, valid law because the legislative power is 
authorized by the constitution to declare them such. The constitution further-
more empowers judges to decide legal conflicts on the basis of the law and the 
constitution is itself valid because it was declared by the formal constitutional 
lawgiver, often a qualified majority in parliament. This chain of validity is hier-
archically ordered, but the buck has to stop somewhere. Hart argues that the rule 
(or convention) of recognition is ultimately a particular practice people regard as 
obligatory, and this is where the chain is ultimately founded; this conventional 
social fact is the fountainhead of law as we know it.
4. Regulative and Constitutive Rules
John Searle offers an account of how we collectively create such a legal order that 
has proved to be highly influential among Hart’s followers. Searle’s The Construc-
tion of Social Reality (1995) seems to fit Hart’s positivism like a glove because the 
distinction between duty-conferring primary rules and power-conferring sec-
ondary rules coincides (at least largely) with Searle’s distinction between ‘regu-
lative rules’ and ‘constitutive rules’ (Cp. Weissbourd & Mertz 1985, p. 627, 628). 
This has opened up an interesting perspective for understanding Hart’s analysis 
of the concept of law, and many have since explored this idea. The result is known 
as ‘institutionalism’, pioneered by Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger in their 
groundbreaking An Institutional Theory of Law (1986). I will, however, focus on the 
work of Andrei Marmor here, whose version ‘Legal Conventionalism’ also builds 
on the work of Hart and John Searle. Let me try and give a short outline of law as 
a system of regulative and constitutive rules.
Regulative rules regulate a previously existing practice, while constitutive rules 
are at the very foundation of the practice involved in the sense that they form its 
structure. In Searle’s own words: ‘constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they 
create or define new forms of behaviour’ (1969, p. 33, 1999, p. 123; Cp. Marmor 
2006a, p. 350). The convention prescribing that we drive on the right side of the 
road, for instance, solves a coordination problem in the sense that it is not impor-
tant on which side in particular we drive but all the more that we all drive on the 
same side of the road (Cp. Lewis 2002). This convention is thereby an example 
of a regulatory rule that is premised on the need to behave in a predictable and 
therefore regular way, not on the content of the particular rule. Many legal rules 
are of this nature, of course.
Marmor, however, argues that, although conventions are indeed often the rela-
tively arbitrary solution to coordination problems, there are also conventions in 
society where there was no previous coordination problem to solve. Such ‘consti-
tutive conventions’, as he calls them, make a particular practice possible in the 
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first place.8 The practice has a point, of course, and the particular human needs 
and values it serves are part of the meaning of the constitutive rules involved, 
but there is no previous practice that is now regulated. Moreover, as these rules 
are constitutive of the practice, the practice can be thought of as (at least partly) 
autonomous: ‘its autonomy […] consists in the fact that the conventions consti-
tuting the practice are radically underdetermined by those general values and 
human concerns that they instantiate’ (Marmor 1998, 520-523).
The game of chess provides us with the classic example. Most, if not all, of the rules 
of this game are constitutive in the sense that without such rules chess would not 
exist – illustrated by the fact that when we change the rules of this game we start 
wondering whether we are still playing chess or some other game. Playing games 
in general satisfies the human need or desire for playful, competitive social inter-
action, which is, at the bottom line, also the point of playing chess.9 However, 
our desire for competitive interaction could be satisfied in many different ways, 
and Marmor argues that this need radically underdetermines what the exact rules 
and particular goals, and thereby the particular character of the game, will be. 
In other words, we know only very little about chess if we only know the human 
need or values it serves. Importantly, exactly this fact makes the practice of play-
ing chess autonomous from other games. When we know the rules, we recognize a 
game of chess when we see it; we are not likely to confuse it with a game of foot-
ball, for instance. Chess has, although it serves human needs and values that are 
also served by other practices, a distinct character of its own.
Indeed, legal institutionalist theory is likewise premised on the idea of the dis-
tinct character, and thereby the autonomy of legal institutions (Ruiter 1998; 
 MacCormick & Weinberger 1986). The human needs and values that are served by 
the law also underdetermine the specific character the law will have in a  particular 
8 ‘Conventions evolve in response to a wide variety of social needs, and the need for coordina-
tion is just one of them. For example, conventions constitute various ways in which we express 
respect to one another, both linguistically and otherwise, conventions constitute artistic gen-
res, games, and numerous social institutions; social conventions often regulate interpersonal 
relationships in such settings as a workplace, or a party, or an academic gathering, and such. 
In short, conventions serve numerous functions by constituting ways in which people interact 
with each other and engage in socially valuable activities’ (Marmor 2006a, p. 357).
9 ‘The rules constituting chess are constitutive conventions. They constitute what chess is and 
how to play the game. In part, they constitute the point of playing the game and some of the 
specific values associated with it. But all this is possible only against the background of a deeper 
layer of shared understandings about what competitive games are. In order to play chess as 
a competitive game of a certain kind, players must follow a fairly elaborate set of norms, or 
deep conventions, determining the concept of games and the essential point(s) of engaging in 
such a practice. Chess, as a game of a particular kind, is only an instantiation of a more general 
human activity that we call “playing a competitive game.” […] Deep conventions typically come 
to our attention when we face some deviant behavior or some doubts about the practice we are 
engaged in. […] The rules of recognition of the kind Hart had in mind are surface conventions. 
They determine what counts as law in a particular legal system or in a particular community. 
These surface conventions of recognition are instantiations of deep conventions about what law 
in our particular culture is. Roughly, the idea is that the rules of recognition relate to the deep 
conventions of law like particular games relate to deep conventions about what it is to play a 
competitive game’ (Marmor 2006a, pp. 364, 366, 369; Cp. Searle 1995 on ‘the Background’). 
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society. Marmor argues, however, that social practices such as law are never com-
pletely autonomous (not even the game of chess) because they are all related to 
some general human concerns, and such general concerns inform many different 
practices that are thereby related (Marmor 1998, 523, 530). Here lies a possible 
weakness of institutionalism. Is the autonomy of the law as a social practice not 
partly the product of a rationalization, or even idealization, of the practice by legal 
science and philosophy?10 If the practice is largely a matter of rule-following we 
might say no; if, by contrast, the practice is largely a matter of judgment, the idea 
of the systematic autonomy of law is just another scientific formalist dream.
According to the institutionalists, however, the autonomy of the practice, how-
ever partial, as the result of the fact that it is a structure of constitutive conven-
tions or rules, has important epistemological and methodological consequences. 
In Speech Acts (1969) John Searle argued that many of these constitutive rules are 
essentially analytic in the sense that they give definitions and confer powers but 
do not describe independently existing facts.11 Such rules specify, for instance, 
what counts as a valid move or what counts as winning the game but do not have 
any empirical content. Thus, constitutive rules can be thought of as analytical 
statements, in the sense that they totally depend for the truth or falsity on the 
definition. In other words, constitutive rules are true by definition:
‘Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose existence 
is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and also 
regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules. 
Regulative rules characteristically take the form of or can be paraphrased 
as imperatives. […] If our paradigms of rules are imperative regulative rules, 
such non-imperative constitutive rules are likely to strike us as extremely 
curious and hardly as rules at all. Notice that they are almost tautological in 
character, for what the ‘rule’ seems to offer is part of a definition of ‘check-
mate’ or ‘touchdown’. That, for example, a checkmate in chess is achieved in 
such and such a way can appear now as a rule, now as an analytic truth based 
on the meaning of ‘checkmate in chess’. That such rules for checkmate can be 
construed as analytic is a clue to the fact that the rule in question is a consti-
tutive one.’ (p. 34)
Driving on the right side of the road is like chess in that it is also a rule-based 
activity. But in this case we can change the rules: we might drive on the left side 
10 We should, however, note that in many continental ‘civil’ law systems the law is largely the 
product of legal science. This is the kind of science that can make its claims to what is law true 
when judges or the legislature make the results of legal scientific analysis and rationalization 
into law.
11 Quine (1953) famously argued that there is no such thing as purely analytic (‘grounded in mean-
ings independently of matters of fact’) as opposed to purely synthetic truths that are grounded 
in fact. Grice and Strawson defended the distinction (1956) by pointing to the particular use 
that is made of it in philosophical circles. I assume here that Searle’s use of the term ‘analytic’ is 
well founded and consistent.
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of the road, for instance, without structurally or essentially changing the practice 
of driving on the road. We are therefore dealing with a regulative rule here and 
not with a constitutive rule. But we should also note something else about the dif-
ference between driving and chess. You can understand road travelling without 
knowing the particular rule to keep on the right side of the road. By contrast, you 
cannot understand chess, you cannot know what chess is, without knowing the 
particular rules of this game. Indeed, even if you know that human beings like 
playful competitive interaction, without knowledge of these rules what you see 
when you watch two people play is completely incomprehensible.
Let us now return to what this example may teach us about the law. Surely law 
consists of regulatory rules. The rule to keep on the right side of the road is actu-
ally a legal rule on the European continent, and so is the rule that forbids citizens 
to kill another human being. This latter rule is regulatory in nature. The fact that 
human beings kill other human beings is a fact of life, whether such a legal rule 
forbidding it exists or not. In order to prevent such violent and socially disruptive 
behaviour, the law prohibits it, and threatens to punish the violation of this rule. 
Criminal law thus has (at least) an ordering function in society, and this function 
is largely to prevent violence and to retaliate if necessary. In the words of John 
Searle,
‘The whole point of the criminal law is regulative, not constitutive. The point 
is to forbid, for example, certain antecedently existing forms of behaviour 
such as killing. But to make the regulations work, there must be sanctions, 
and that requires the imposition of a new status on the person who violates 
the law. […] Thus the regulative ‘Thou shalt not kill’ generates the appropri-
ate constitutive ‘Killing, under certain circumstances, counts as murder, and 
murder counts as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment.’’ (1995, p. 50)
What constitutive rules essentially do is specify the particular conditions under 
which a particular ‘status function’ is imposed on some person or object.12 Many 
human activities and practices that are regulated by means of legal provisions 
existed before these regulations came into force and will remain existent if these 
regulations are changed or abolished. Killing other human beings is regrettably 
among them. The judge is empowered to qualify a particular action as a criminal 
12 Searle (2010): ‘The distinctive feature of human social reality, the way in which it differs from 
other forms of animal reality known to me, is that humans have the capacity to impose func-
tions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform the functions 
solely in virtue of their physical structure. The performance of the function requires that there 
be a collectively recognized status that the person of object has, and it is only in virtue of that 
status that the person or object can perform the function in question. Examples are pretty 
much everywhere: a piece of private property, the president of the United States, a twenty dol-
lar bill, and a professor in a university are all people or objects that are able to perform certain 
functions in virtue of the fact that they have a collectively recognized status that enables them 
to perform those functions in a way they could not do without the collective recognition of the 
status’ (p. 7).
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act and to subsequently declare the suspect guilty as charged by means of a per-
formative utterance. Searle explains that a very simple formula is involved here: 
‘X counts as Y in context C’ (Searle 1995, p. 43, 2010, p. 10). In the context of a 
criminal proceeding the premeditated and intentional killing of another human 
being counts as murder, and the judge is empowered to decide what punishment 
is due.
What is distinctive of the law, then, as opposed to other normative systems in 
society, is that in addition to the primary or regulative legal rules it also consists 
of a supplementary set of rules that specifies, as clearly and distinctly as possible, 
the conditions under which a person can be lawfully qualified as a murder suspect 
and thus arrested. Such rules also regulate the legal procedure according to which 
the suspect’s guilt should be established and when, and by whom, the murderer 
can at the end of such a procedure be convicted to a long-term imprisonment.
To be sure, the law here satisfies the human need for the predictability of the 
state’s reaction to certain behaviour and serves the good or value of protecting 
individuals against the arbitrary use of state power. This may be true, but this 
particular human need radically underdetermines what shape the rules will take 
in a particular legal order. In other words, we cannot say we know the law until we 
know all the specifics, the particular constitutive and regulatory rules involved.13 
When you change these rules significantly, criminal law as a social phenomenon 
undoubtedly changes beyond recognition. Indeed, if you change or abolish enough 
of these rules we do not even recognize it as law anymore.
Thus, law is a complex whole of primary, duty-conferring rules, on the one hand, 
and secondary, power-conferring or constitutive rules, on the other. Constitutive 
rules or conventions do not merely regulate but also constitute legal practices and 
institutions. The complex and intricate set of these constitutive rules gives the 
law its specific structure or character; and we can therefore say that Hart was 
right when he said that in modern societies a legal system is structurally different 
from other normative phenomena. If we want to know what the law demands 
of us and what this means exactly, we turn to this particular system of primary 
and secondary legal rules. This system is also the prime subject matter of what is 
traditionally known as doctrinal legal research.
13 Marmor argues that this explains the conventional nature of the rule of recognition and the 
rules it identifies as legal rules. The legal order is ‘radically underdetermined’ by the general 
purposes and values it serves, and the legal order can therefore take different shapes and colors. 
‘First, it is crucial to realize that the needs, functions, or values that such conventions respond 
to radically underdetermine the content of the rules that constitute the relevant social practice. 
Our need or desire to play some competitive intellectual board game does not determine the 
content of the rules of chess; the creative needs or desires to stage dramatic performances do 
not determine the particular theatrical genres that have emerged over time in various cultures; 
the reasons for showing respect to people under various circumstances do not determine the 
practices of etiquette that we have’ (2001b, p. 360; Cp. Postema 2011, p. 524).
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5. Language and Institutional Facts
Let us now explore the implications of what we have learned. To begin with, let 
us change our perspective and try and look scientifically at a game of chess; that 
is, from a strictly external point of view (while keeping the example of law in 
the back of our mind). What do we see exactly when we closely watch two people 
play? Of course, we can discern patterns in the movements of the two players. 
From these patterns we might induce that particular physical laws are at work. 
But notice that these physical laws are not truly perceptible. David Hume made 
us aware of the fact that we only see patterns; we do not actually see the laws 
that explain the regularities. Seeing the physical laws behind or underlying these 
patterns or correlations is a matter of interpretation. We, so to speak, ‘add’ this 
information as the result of previous experience (Hume argued, in fact, that the 
fact that we see causality is the product of custom) or – and there is scientific 
evidence for this – as the result of our particular biological make-up (Kahneman 
2011, p. 76).
What can never be truly perceived by someone taking the external point of view 
is that these patterns are the result of not merely certain physical laws at work 
but also the players following certain rules. This was, of course, a major point for 
Hart. Seeing people abide by rules is certainly a matter of interpretation: because 
we know the rules of the game of chess we understand the reasons for the moves 
the players make, and we see how these moves contribute to the ultimate goal of 
defeating the other by checkmating the king. Like causality, we do not truly see 
these rules; seeing the behaviour as the result of following rules is also a matter 
of interpretation that requires particular knowledge of and experience with the 
rules in question. Hart explicitly argued that it requires an internal, hermeneutical 
point of view.14
One might therefore argue that the physicist and the analyst of social institutions 
such as a game of chess work on different levels of description. The physicist anal-
yses the patterns in order to formulate a theory regarding the physical laws that 
explain patterns in the behaviour of natural objects. The analyst of the game of 
chess, by contrast, analyses the patterns in the behaviour of the two players and 
proposes an understanding in the sense of an interpretation of this behaviour 
within the context of the general rules and purposes of playing a game of chess. 
Without any foreknowledge of this particular context we do not see the game; and 
it is actually a defining feature of the physicist’s habitus, and its external perspec-
tive, to abstract away from such social meanings to focus on the underlying phys-
ical structure. Indeed, with regard to the natural world we have only an external 
perspective, while with regard to our social world an external perspective does 
not truly exist because from such a point of view it totally vanishes.
14 ‘For the understanding of this the methodology of the empirical sciences is useless; what is 
needed is a “hermeneutic” method which involves portraying rule-governed behavior as it 
appears to its participants, who see it as conforming or failing to conform to certain shared 
standards’ (Hart 1983, 13; Cp. MacCormick & Weinberger 1986, 15).
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There are a number of interesting things we should now note about the rules of 
chess. First, although these rules are formulated in natural language terms, they 
are not so vague and indeterminate as we might expect. (Bertrand Russell would 
agree that the rules of chess are, for one thing, much more clear and distinct than 
much of the traditional philosophy he so vehemently criticized is.) Indeed, when 
in doubt, you can refer to a rule book. The rules of chess are now accepted all 
over the world as they are collected, unified and ‘codified’ in a rule book that is 
officially recognized by the World Chess Federation. Chess players, and especially 
chess officials and referees worldwide, thus use a (conventional) rule of recognition 
to identify the rules of the game. Many even know these rules by heart. In other 
words, chess is a highly institutionalized practice.
Second, unlike traffic rules that were referred to, the rules of chess do not reg-
ulate some preexisting practice. As already mentioned, without these rules the 
game of chess would not exist at all, and changing one of those rules immediately 
raises the question whether we are still playing chess or some other (new) game. 
Many games do have rules that can be thought of as arbitrary in the sense that we 
might change them without changing the character of the game beyond recogni-
tion. Hart often refers to such regulatory rules of a game, but he also recognizes 
the existence of rules ‘which veto certain types of conduct under penalty and sec-
ondary rules which specify what must be done to score or to win’ (1961, p. 9). The 
latter will most likely be essential in the sense that changing them will literally be 
a game changer; they are thus constitutive rules or conventions.
This implies that the game cannot be adequately described and explained by 
means of a set of rules, terms, concepts and distinctions other than those that 
are used in the practice under scrutiny. We can describe and explain natural phe-
nomena with the help of mathematical equations (which are not constitutive of 
the natural order), but we cannot, for instance, describe legal institutions and 
practices in non-legal terms without seriously distorting them. Searle argued that 
constitutive rules are analytic, and changing the jargon will therefore be a game 
changer in the sense that we will not recognize it to be about law anymore. Legal 
scholars therefore ‘employ the same legal terms, and treat them with compara-
ble levels of respect or disdain. This shared conceptual framework between legal 
scholars and their subject matter may be referred to as the unity of discourse’ 
(Rubin 1988, p. 1859-1860).
Importantly, and this is the third point, the game of chess consists in a system 
of rules and is therefore completely normative in nature. Searle argues that the 
whole of our social reality is indeed normative in this sense. The basic structure 
of our social reality, and that of the law as a distinct part of it, is thus deonto-
logical. Searle argues that the whole structure is based on a systematic whole of 
collectively recognized rights and duties; that is, on a complex system of social 
competences and obligations that are conferred on persons and things (used by 
persons) with the help of constitutive rules (2010, p. 80-84). Hart’s analysis of 
law as a system of rules seems congruent with Searle’s theory in that, as I have 
argued, in both cases it is rules all the way down.
We should now note one last thing about the game of chess: without a language 
to formulate and communicate the rules of chess this game would not exist. 
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 Playing a game of chess is therefore completely language dependent in a way that 
the existence of the natural world around us is not – or so Searle argues (1995, 
p. 60-66). This is also true of our social reality generally, and of the law in par-
ticular. But the fact that this practice is language dependent does not mean that 
the chess analyst, or anyone who knows the rules and purpose of this game, can-
not make objective statements about, for instance, the famous World Champion-
ship match between Boris Spassky and Bobby Fisher in 1972. Searle argues that, 
within a particular practice such as chess, the statement that Fisher won this 
game by 12½–8½, and thus became the new World Champion is a true statement. 
These are thus perfectly objective facts, he says, albeit facts of a particular kind: 
‘institutional facts’.
‘Some facts exist independently of any human institution. I call these brute 
facts. But some facts require human institutions in order to exist at all. An 
example of a brute fact is that the Earth is 93 million miles from the sun, 
and an example of an institutional fact is that Barack Obama is president of 
the United States. Institutional facts are typically objective facts, but oddly 
enough, they are only facts by human agreement or acceptance. Such facts 
require institutions for their existence. […] And what exactly is a human insti-
tution? […] An institution is a system of constitutive rules, and such a system 
automatically creates the possibility of institutional facts.’ (2010, p. 10)
This means that, although the rules of chess are normative – they prescribe what 
you should and should not do – playing a game of chess is in itself a fact. Being lan-
guage dependent, such a fact is, of course, not a ‘brute fact’ of nature like Mount 
Everest is but what Searle dubbed an ‘institutional fact’ (Searle 2010, p. 10). Such 
institutional facts are the product of collectively ascribing or imposing a particu-
lar function and status on particular objects, persons and behaviour. When you 
participate in such an institution you can objectively describe, analyse and explain 
what people do, and exactly what it is that they are trying to achieve. Indeed, 
Searle argues that although institutional facts are a matter of interpretation and 
therefore ‘ontologically subjective’, the fact that people collectively recognize the 
status functions and meanings of the particular moves in the practice makes 
institutional facts ‘typically objective facts’. Thus, although they are ontologically 
subjective, they are ‘epistemologically objective’ (1995, p. 8).
Hart’s argument has been construed by institutionalists as saying that this also 
goes for law. Law is just as language dependent as chess: without language, law 
does not exist. But from within legal practices and institutions we can make epis-
temologically objective statements about the law, just as we can about chess. The 
whole complex of secondary rules in a legal order can be thought of as constitutive 
of that order; it is, in other words, what characterizes the legal order as such and 
thereby distinguishes it from other social phenomena such as morality. We can 
thus link Hart’s analytical jurisprudence to Searle’s social constructivist philos-
ophy: Hart’s secondary rules are (at least largely) constitutive rules in Searle’s 
sense.
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There is one last important implication I want to mention here. This concept of 
law as an institutional fact makes the idea of objective legal science feasible. We 
can study the law as a system of regulative and constitutive rules or conventions 
in a relatively detached way; that is, we can describe, analyse and understand the 
law without actively endorsing, or committing to, the normative claims such laws 
make or the values and interests they serve (Hart 1983, p. 14-15; Postema 2011, 
p. 289). Indeed, legal positivism is ‘Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’, Marmor 
writes, and we can objectively describe and analyse the law before we evaluate it 
according to, for instance, a particular conception of justice or morality. Thus, a 
legal scientist can, and should, meet the criterion of providing a value-free anal-
ysis of his subject matter.
6. Conclusion
What did the chess analogy teach us? According to the legal positivists, we can 
think of law as a practice that is, at least, partially autonomous and built out of 
constitutive rules or constitutive conventions. Law and chess are both heavily 
institutionalized practices, and that makes the comparison the more interesting. 
We all learned what chess is by learning what the exact objective of the game is 
and what the rules are, and subsequently by playing the game according to its 
rules, of course. When we are in doubt about the rules, we can refer to an author-
itative institutional source to find them. Chess players and legal subjects alike 
apply some kind of rule or convention to distinguish the rules of their ‘game’ from 
the rules of other practices, institutionalized or not.
Of course, chess is much more autonomous than law is, but the analogy helps us 
understand how the law can be partially autonomous in the first place. Further-
more, just as we can distinguish chess from other games (although they serve the 
same fundamental function), we can see how law has its own distinct structure 
as compared with other norm systems in society. Marmor argued that law, like 
chess, also has a certain independence from the human needs and values that it 
serves, because these underlying purposes do not determine the exact rules and 
standards of the law as it stands. Thus, to know the law we turn to the sources of 
law as they are identified by the rule of recognition; there is no necessary connec-
tion with rules and standards of other normative phenomena in society such as 
morality.
Another interesting finding is that the game of chess, or a particular game for 
that matter, cannot truly be described in terms other than its own. Likewise, law 
is a structure of norms that can be described only from an internal perspective 
and in its own terms; an external perspective and a foreign jargon will distort 
the subject under inquiry because it will change it beyond recognition. Hart dis-
trusted the reductionist tendencies in the social sciences of his day and therefore 
felt much more at home in the Oxford school that practised ‘ordinary language 
philosophy’ and therefore took (legal) discourse at face value (Postema 2011, 
p. 265). To be sure, there are many empirical questions we can ask with regard to 
law that require a different method of inquiry, but the analogy with chess opens 
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our eyes to the fact that law is generally to be studied and analysed from within, 
on its own account, and that we should try and appreciate the sophistication and 
the often subtle precision of legal language as the historical product of dealing 
with specific social and political problems.
Moreover, not only is this structure of a normative nature but it also claims 
authority in the sense that we are all supposed to observe the law in the sense of 
obeying it. The fact that the law claims authority in itself makes it important that 
we can distinguish legal norms from other norms in society. However, not only 
citizens who want to know what the law demands of them will want to be able to 
distinguish law from morality, for instance; but also legal research will start by 
delineating their subject of inquiry from other subjects. Before evaluating the 
subject under scrutiny they will first have to describe the law under scrutiny, in 
the sense that they will have to give a fair and unprejudiced – ‘detached’ – account 
of what their object of inquiry is, before criticizing (or praising) the law as they 
found it.
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